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Biographia Literaria and the Language of Science
Abstract
When Coleridge began dictating his Biographia Literaria in 1815, he was at the same time becoming actively
involved in a medico-philosophical controversy that was then drawing the attention of many medical men and
philosophers in England. The fundamental issue behind the quarrel, a materialistic versus a vitalist theory of
nature, was one Coleridge had argued in one form or another throughout his career.1 Yet, the challenge of
modern science specifically had never been so strong nor had it so vociferously demanded his attention as it
did in the years from 1814 to 1819. Coleridge's response is well documented: the revised and enlarged version
of The Friend, his Lay Sermons, the "Theory of Life," and a series of philosophical letters written between
November 1816 and January 1818 all testify to Coleridge's growing concern with the challenge of science to
his philosophy and to his need to validate his philosophical beliefs with scientific evidence.
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 BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA AND THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
 BY TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
 As far as words go, I have become a formidable chemist.
 Coleridge, Letter to Humphry Davy, 1801
 When Coleridge began dictating his Biographia Literaria in 1815, he
 was at the same time becoming actively involved in a medico-philosophi-
 cal controversy that was then drawing the attention of many medical men
 and philosophers in England. The fundamental issue behind the quarrel,
 a materialistic versus a vitalist theory of nature, was one Coleridge had
 argued in one form or another throughout his career.1 Yet, the challenge
 of modern science specifically had never been so strong nor had it so vo-
 ciferously demanded his attention as it did in the years from 1814 to
 1819. Coleridge's response is well documented: the revised and enlarged
 version of The Friend, his Lay Sermons, the "Theory of Life," and a series
 of philosophical letters written between November 1816 and January
 1818 all testify to Coleridge's growing concern with the challenge of sci-
 ence to his philosophy and to his need to validate his philosophical beliefs
 with scientific evidence. In one of his letters to C. A. Tulk, Coleridge
 prefaces a long account of the forces of nature with these remarks: "In
 my literary Life you will find a sketch of the subjective Pole of the Dy-
 namic Philosophy. ... In the third volume of the Friend, now in the
 Press, you will find the great results of this Philosophy in its relation to
 Ethics and Theology-while the enclosed Scrawl contains a very, very
 rude and fragmentary delineation of the Objective Pole, or the Science of
 the Construction of Nature." la The enclosed scrawl is in fact an abstract
 of Coleridge's "Theory of Life," his most detailed and comprehensive
 scientific treatise and a work which refers explicitly to John Abernethy
 and other major figures in the then current medical controversy. The
 literary life is of course the Biographia Literaria, roughly contempora-
 neous with the posthumously published "Theory of Life" and likewise in
 the orbit of the scientific debates. That the Biographia Literaria also refers
 to scientists involved in the medical debate is only tangentially significant;
 that the Biographia Literaria employs much of the scientific language used
 in the "Theory of Life" and implicitly derives many of its critical models
 See, e.g., Walter Jackson Bates' Samuel Taylor Coleridge (New York, 1968).
 la Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. E. L. Griggs (London,
 1956-59), IV, 767.
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 from the scientific models sketched in that work is, however, extremely
 significant, for it shows Coleridge transferring the scientific discourse
 which suffused his intellectual life at the time to another discourse, literary
 criticism. Probably no other alteration in the language of literary criticism
 has affected the practice of criticism more.
 Coleridge's prolific response to the medical controversy surrounding
 the composition of the Biographia Literaria was, of course, the product
 of many years of reading and thinking about science. Since his early years
 at Christ's Hospital, Coleridge flirted on and off with biology and chemis-
 try; and his meeting in 1799 with Humphry Davy (1778-1829) marked
 the beginning of a friendship that inspired Coleridge to seek metaphors
 for his poetry and solutions to his own metaphysical problems in scientific
 research. In one of the rare articles on Coleridge and science, Kathleen
 Coburn relates how, at its outset, this friendship between the father of the
 new chemistry and the father of the new criticism was mutually produc-
 tive: Coleridge shared much of Davy's scientific reading, and as Coleridge
 searched for the laws within the impalpable, within poems, Davy "was
 searching out laws of substances hitherto unknown by revealing that be-
 neath the static appearance of the stone, or the powder . . . there may be
 the flame, the loud bang, the explosive energy. They were both enraptured
 by the revelation of unsuspected relationships in the vast diversity of
 things, inanimate as well as animate." It is not surprising, then, that Cole-
 ridge's and Davy's descriptions of the poet and the scientist respectively
 are strikingly similar, or that "Coleridge's description in Biographia Lit-
 eraria of the imagination derives at least some of its vitality and power
 from the fact that although he is talking about the nature of poetry, he
 might in places equally be talking about Davy's chemistry."2
 2 Kathleen Coburn, "Coleridge, a Bridge Between Science and Poetry: Reflec-
 tions on the Bicentenary of his Birth," in Coleridge's Variety, ed. John Beer (Lon-
 don, 1974), 91, 95. My entire essay is indebted to some suggestions in Coburn's
 article, and I am more generally indebted to M. H. Abrams' "Coleridge's 'A Light
 in Sound': Science, Metascience, and Imagination," Proceedings of the American
 Philosophical Society, 116 (1972), 458-75. In addition, Professor Meyer Schapiro
 has informed me of one of Coleridge's richer scientific observations. Coleridge, in
 his Notebooks (ed. Kathleen Coburn), no. 3116 (f. 13, July-Oct. 1807), writes,
 "Red, Green, and Violet the only colors," and tries to work out the results of
 mixtures of two colors accordingly. His Idea comes straight out of Thomas
 Young's new theory - now called the Young-Helmholtz theory. Although Coburn
 searched the Philosophical Transactions for the period of Coleridges's Notebooks,
 she missed Young's article: "Production of Colours" in which he presents this
 system of the primary colors. It was published in the volume for 1902, p. 395.
 The theory is presented again in Young's Lectures on Natural Philosophy, lecture
 XXXVII (1807). Others, like David Brewster, continued to hold to the view that
 red, yellow, and blue were the primaries because painters could produce all colors
 by these and the mixture of two or all three. It's possible that Coburn missed
 Young's text because it's not in the first article he published in that volume but
 in a correction in a later page in the same volume. I am grateful to Professor
 Schapiro for the above information.
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 It is important to realize, however, that these affinities between Cole-
 ridge and Davy are based on Davy's work around 1802, ten years before
 the waning of their intellectual friendship. Coleridge avidly followed
 Davy's 1802 lectures and read his work for many years after; but the
 famous marginal note to Boehme's Aurora (1612) summarizes the vicis-
 situdes of a relationship strained by the demands of modern science:
 O how gladly would I resign my life . . . to procure for mankind such health
 and longevity to H. Davy, as should enable him to discover the Element of
 metals, of Sulphur and of Carbon. O! he will do it! Yea and may perhaps reveal
 the synthetic Idea of the Antithets, Attraction and Repulsion.
 S. T. C.
 Alas! since I wrote the preceding note H. Davy is become Sir Humphry Davy
 and an Atomist!3
 As M. H. Abrams illustrates in The Mirror and the Lamp, using writers
 like Keats as examples, the personal misunderstandings between Davy
 and Coleridge were in part a product of general rift in England between
 science and poetry in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Coleridge
 belonging to the poetic school of spirit and imagination and Davy often
 tending toward a progressive science which was becoming increasingly
 mechanistic and materialistic. Davy, in fact, never totally accepted the
 theories of atomists like Dalton, and he and Coleridge would always re-
 main distant admirers. Yet the gap that atomistic science was creating
 between poetry and science made it increasingly difficult for them to share
 and discuss philosophies. Unhappily for the poets, the disparity between
 the two disciplines could only diminish poetry's value, as scientists claimed
 that the poetic vision was a fantastic way of knowing with little relevance
 to the scientific laws of nature. For Coleridge, this claim-that there was
 an inherent and inescapable conflict between science and poetry-was
 intolerable, for if the scientific validity of imaginative perception could
 not be maintained, the moral principles founded on that imaginative per-
 ception would be in danger of dissipating as ethereal musings. Thus in
 the Treatise on Method (1818) he bemoans a world suffering "from a
 subversion of the natural and necessary order of science: from elevating
 the terrestrial, as it were called, above the celestial; and from summoning
 Reason and Faith to the bar of that limited Physical experience."4 The
 visions of science and poetry must remain parallel and complementary
 ways of seeing, both supporting a dynamic and spiritual conception of
 life; and the rise of a mechanistic science in 1812 became, consequently,
 a betrayal representative of a trend that had to be countered in every way
 possible.
 Cited in Alice D. Snyder, Coleridge on Logic and Learning (New Haven,
 1929), 23.
 4S. T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method, ed. Alice D. Snyder (London, 1934), 8.
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 Hard on the heels of the disagreements between Coleridge and Davy,
 the medical controversy of 1814-1819 erupted around issues closely re-
 sembling those that separated the two men. The writings of John Hunter
 catalyzed the debate whose principal spokesmen were John Abernethy
 (1764-1831) and Sir William Lawrence (1783-1867): Abernethy
 championed Hunter's spiritual and dynamic principles of life, and Law-
 rence charged that Abernethy's misinterpretations of Hunter were ridicu-
 lously unscientific, that Abernethy and his followers arbitrarily-and
 sometimes fantastically-used strictly scientific phenomena like magne-
 tism or electricity to account for life itself. Abernethy's vital principle,
 according to Lawrence, was "like a camel, or like a whale, or like what
 you please."5 Documenting the main points of this argument in Cole-
 ridge on Logic and Learning, Alice Snyder notes that the "fundamental
 questions of the controversy seem to have been two: first, the relation
 of structure to function; second, the place of theory in physiological in-
 vestigation-broadly speaking, the method of scientific thought and pro-
 cedure." 6
 The battle lines on the two questions were clearly drawn. Operating
 from an avowed theological foundation, Abernethy "could accept no
 physical science that did violence to his conception of spirit."7 The life
 force, he maintained, was independent of organization and structure and
 prior to it, for the priority of function to structure was essential to the
 concept of functional unity in any organism. Lawrence, on the other
 hand, kept his biology and his theology segregated. For him, that an or-
 ganism was the product of organization was an irrefragable scientific fact,
 independent of religious questions. Regarding the second question, it is
 almost needless to point out that Lawrence, the laboratory worker, strong-
 ly objected to theories and hypotheses and minimized the role of specu-
 lation in scientific labor as much as possible. But Abernethy made the
 most of theory and hypotheses, and "justified them on grounds that sug-
 gest the instrumentalist's point of view; he justified them, that is, on
 grounds of the concrete investigation that they provoked and con-
 trolled." 7a
 If these were the questions Hunter's work raised and the solutions
 each faction loudly proclaimed, it goes without saying that both Aber-
 nethy and Lawrence discovered in Hunter what they wanted to discover,
 a way of responding that Coleridge was equally guilty of when he entered
 the ring of the debate. After rehearsing the quarrel, in his "Theory of
 Life," Coleridge hails Abernethy's role in developing "the true idea of
 life," a dynamic philosophy like Coleridge's own which gave priority to
 5 Sir William Lawrence, Introduction to Comparative Anatomy (1816), 169.
 6 Snyder, 18.
 7 Snyder, 21.
 7aIbid.
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 function over structure and emphasized the laws of nature rather than
 the arrangement of particles. "In Mr. Abernethy's Lecture on the Theory
 of Life," Coleridge writes, "it is impossible not to see a presentiment of
 a great truth. ... If the opinions here supported are the same with those
 of Mr. Abernethy I rejoice in his authority. If they are different, I shall
 wait with anxious interest for an exposition of that difference."8 Thor-
 oughly idiosyncratic, "Theory of Life" is Coleridge's defense of Hunter's
 and Abernethy's vitalism; it attempts to prove and to illustrate that "Life
 itself is not a thing-a self-subsistent hypostasis-but an act and a proc-
 ess" (TL, 430). The arrangement of separate bodies or atoms does not
 explain life; rather, "The most comprehensive formula to which life is
 reducible, would be that of the internal copula of bodies, or ... the power
 which discloses itself from within as a principle of unity in the many"
 (TL, 384). To prove these claims Coleridge presents a detailed outline
 of the evolution of life as it manifests itself through the conjunction of
 three forces, magnetism, electricity, and what Coleridge labeled "chemi-
 cal affinity." Not surprisingly, each of these forces plays an important
 role in Biographia Literaria.
 In its intent and language, "Theory of Life" is clearly a scientific tract,
 directed at a scientific audience and employing the scientific discourse that
 Coleridge knew from his attendance at Royal Society lectures and his
 indefatigable reading of such scientific journals as William Nicholson's
 Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, and the Arts and the Royal
 Society's Philosophical Transactions. There is some difficulty, though, in
 isolating a "scientific discourse" in 1815, since a specialized language for
 science is only just emerging at this time, just as a specialized thinker
 called a scientist is only just beginning to be recognized.9 Coleridge ob-
 viously belongs to an earlier tradition where the scientist is first of all a
 natural philosopher, perhaps best described by the passage from the Re-
 public which Coleridge translates as his epigraph to an essay in The
 Friend (1818); Plato distinguishes here between mere "Philotheorists,"
 and "those whom alone you may rightly denominate Philosophers, as
 knowing what the science of all three branches of science is, which may
 prove something more than the mere aggregate of the knowledge of any
 particular science.""0 Nineteenth-century scientists, however, could not
 be comfortable with this archaic conception of their role. They needed
 the precision provided by specialization in thought and language. So while
 Coleridge disparages Davy "who seems more and more determined to
 mould himself upon the Age, in order to make the Age mould itself upon
 8"Hints Towards a More Comprehensive Theory of Life," Miscellanies,
 Aesthetic and Literary, ed. T. Ashe (London, 1911), 405-06, (Hereafter, TL).
 9See David M. Knight, "The Scientist as Sage," Studies in Romanticism, 6
 (1967), 65-88.
 10 The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke (London, 1969), I, 472.
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 him,"" Davy sees Coleridge's tragedy as a failure to adjust to the exi-
 gencies of modern science. Coleridge's philosophical language simply
 lacks the "order, precision, and regularity" to deal with the problems of
 contemporary science.12
 Purporting to be more precise and better disciplined, Davy and his
 colleagues were isolating themselves in their laboratories and fashioning
 their own specialized vocabulary. Hence, whether Coleridge liked the situ-
 ation or not, if he wished to argue his philosophy with these men, he had
 to learn to use their language. This does not mean that traces of other
 discourses, particularly of theology, cannot be found in the scientific vo-
 cabulary of 1815. But, after 1800, even in Coleridge's writings, scientific
 discourse surfaces with enough autonomy to isolate it, and the "Theory
 of Life" is the clearest evidence of Coleridge's own use of that language
 to defend his beleaguered vitalism.
 Indeed, translating his own views of science into a moder scientific
 idiom becomes a major project for Coleridge in 1815; but equally im-
 portant is the extent to which this scientific model can explain other phe-
 nomena, such as art, and how far these other phenomena will corroborate
 his scientific findings, since implicit in Coleridge's monistic idealism is
 the common foundation of all areas of knowledge. Coleridge himself
 never doubts, of course, that there are such philosophical links between
 science and other disciplines. Writing to Tulk in 1817, he says that "True
 Philosophy . . . takes its roots in Science in order to blossom into Reli-
 gion,"13 and in a letter to Lord Liverpool the same year, he recalls his
 hope that his own idealistic metaphysics will be confirmed by Davy and
 "the late successful researches of the Chemists" which have demonstrated
 that "in all pure phaenomena we behold only the copula, the balance or
 indifference of opposite energies." Moreover, in the same letter after dis-
 cussing speculative science, physiology, and "Demiurgic atoms," Coleridge
 asks "What is all this to the world at large?" His answer goes some way
 in explaining why he does not confine scientific language to a scientific
 treatise, but transfers it to other fields, notably the field of literature in
 Biographia Literaria. Throughout history, he argues, science or natural
 philosophy has maintained so direct a structural correspondence with
 other cultural phenomena that this correspondence "must remain inex-
 plicable, unless we admit not only a reaction and interdependence on
 both sides, but a powerful, the most indirect influence" of science on the
 other fields of knowledge. Using examples of art from the medieval period
 and the eighteenth century, he comments, in a way that might anticipate
 the twentieth-century philosopher Michel Foucault, "these are all but the
 ribs, abutments and sea-marks of a long line of correspondencies in the
 11 Collected Letters, II, 1042.
 12 S. H. Davy, Fragmentary Remains, ed. John Davy (1858), 74.
 13 Collected Letters, IV, 76.
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 arts of Taste to the opposite coast of speculative Philosophy." In short,
 systems of thought and signification affect the structure of contempora-
 neous systems, so that an error in a system like speculative philosophy or
 science could be disseminated throughout other systems. Thus, the "recent
 relapse ... of the Chemists to the atomistic scheme, and the almost unani-
 mous acceptance of Dalton's Theory in England, & Le Sage's in France
 determine the intellectual character of the age with the force of an ex-
 perimentum crucis;" 14 and even poetry is in danger of being degraded by
 a mechanistic science whose laws and models will inevitably affect literary
 criticism and poetry. There is a "link or mordaunt by which philosophy
 becomes scientific and sciences philosophical,"15 and likewise there is a
 link between science and poetry which would allow for the corruption
 of poetry by science and the substantiation of both through the truth they
 share. "If in the greatest poets we find Nature idealized through the cre-
 ative power of a profound yet observant meditation, so through the medi-
 tative observation of a Davy, a Wollaston, a Hatchett, or a Murray, ...
 we find poetry, as it were, substantiated and realized." l
 In 1815 Coleridge's task, then, was to establish the connections be-
 tween his scientific models and the realm of poetry, connections which the
 scientific community especially were ignoring or denying. In the perspec-
 tive of Coleridge's visionary philosophy, these connections were clearly
 present; he needed, however, to substantiate and realize them for the
 world at large and specifically for his scientific competitors. The solution
 was in language; and ease and accuracy in transferring the language of
 "Theory of Life"-the scientists' own inbred tongue-to Biographia
 Literaria became the most direct and effective way of illustrating the
 commensurability, even the authority, of both Coleridge's science and his
 poetics.
 The way scientific language permeates literary definitions and practi-
 cal criticism will be my primary concern here; and these areas of Biog-
 raphia Literaria generally relate to the biological issue of function versus
 structural arrangement. But the second topic of these debates, the value
 of theory in investigative research, also plays a large role in the Bio-
 graphia. This second issue is naturally less directly involved with language
 itself, and, further, critics of Coleridge are more apt to discuss it, though
 rarely in the context of the medical debates which greatly influenced Cole-
 ridge's thinking about theory. Snyder notes that during the medical de-
 bates, Coleridge
 was forced into a fundamental consideration of the processes of thought. There
 resulted a vivid realization of the extent to which all thinking is determined by
 assumptions, ideas, images, and attitudes of even less tangible sorts. Coleridge's
 14 Collected Letters, IV, 758-62.
 15 The Friend, I, 463.
 1 Treatise on Method, 25.
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 insistence that fertilized thinking involved more than induction, and experience
 more than what is commonly meant to empiricists; that the premises are the
 critical part of reasoning, and that they depend on something other than the
 understanding-on a power that brings into play the total man,-these prin-
 ciples of thought and method were formulated through his contacts with many
 philosophical minds, but to no small extent their use in the physiological and
 chemical controversies in which he took part.17
 More specifically, Coleridge was faced with a choice between Abernethy's
 method based on theory and Lawrence's method of supposed objectivity
 based on observation exclusively. He rejected both, however, in favor of
 his own method based on law, a method derived at least in part from
 Kant.17a A scientific definition, Coleridge claims in "Theory of Life,"
 should be neither a theory nor a generalization. It consists instead "in the
 law of the thing, or in such an idea of it, as being admitted all the proper-
 ties and functions are admitted by implication. It must likewise be so far
 causal, that a full insight having been attained of the law, we derive from
 it a progressive insight into the necessity and generation of the phaenom-
 ena of which it is the law" (TL, 370). In Method and Imagination in
 Coleridge's Criticism, J. R. de J. Jackson treats fully Coleridge's indi-
 vidual preference for "law over theory," his conclusions usually being
 correct and usually standard.l8 According to Jackson, the pursuit deter-
 mines the method; the specific ends determine the means employed. Thus,
 a scientist like Abernethy apprehends truth, "the Communicative Intelli-
 gence," through material evidence, and must rely on the inexact method
 of theory which is primarily an educated guess based on prior research.
 The poet, on the other hand, apprehends intelligence by looking through
 the material substance to the essence of phenomena, discovering the law
 and then presenting the law in the language of the poem. The poem does
 not depend on the material world for his knowledge. Here Jackson fol-
 lows Coleridge's thought quite accurately, but there are two important
 qualifications to add to his discussion: first, in "Theory of Life," Cole-
 ridge argues, in opposition to speculative scientists, for a scientific method
 based on law, suggesting therefore the same method for poetry and sci-
 ence; and secondly, explaining method in Coleridge's theory, Jackson
 overlooks the reader-critic whose method is different from the poet's and
 who is the real subject of Biographia Literaria. (If nothing else, the
 amount of time and space Coleridge uses to berate hack critics tells us
 that he is discussing a way of investigating poetry, not the way to make a
 poem, that he is explaining poetry, not accounting for it.) Though these
 may be fine distinctions, they are very important ones, for it is in these
 distinctions that the medical debates most obviously make their mark on
 17 Snyder, 31.
 17a Kant defined "nature in general" as "the conformity to law of all appear-
 ances in Space and Time" (Critique of Pure Reason, B165).
 18 Method and Imagination in Coleridge Criticism (London, 1969).
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 the Biographia: in 1815 the scientific method that Coleridge urges on
 both Abernethy and Lawrence is one based on law, and accordingly, the
 critical methodology he proposes and uses in Biographia Literaria de-
 pends on philosophical law. Both the scientist and the critic work with
 more or less refined material data, and for both only Coleridge's proce-
 dure based on law can guarantee objectivity and accuracy. In short,
 though the critic, the poet, and the scientist all search out law, the critic
 reading the poem is more like the scientist investigating a chemical reac-
 tion than like a poet writing a poem.
 Investigating poetry in 1815, then, Coleridge works according to his
 self-defined scientific method in which laws are the lamps of good re-
 search, and, as in biological research, these laws "of poetry cannot be
 given from without" but "are the very powers of growth and reproduc-
 tion"'9 which the critic must perceive. Here, as in every science, "it is
 the essence of a scientific definition to be causative, . . . by announcing
 the law of action in the particular case, in subordination to the common
 law of which all phenomena are modifications or results" (TL, 370).
 Thus in Biographia Literaria Coleridge's theoretical definitions do not
 describe how to make a poem or propose generalized standards or theories
 against which to measure a poem; they describe instead the laws of poetry
 as formal causes in every poem, and Coleridge's criticisms of Wordsworth,
 for instance, point out deviations from these laws. Appropriately, Cole-
 ridge's tone and method is that of a biologist noting freakish deviations
 in the laws of nature. After presenting the primary laws-polarity, the
 secondary imagination, the laws of meter-he examines his material in
 their light; concentrating on Wordsworth and Shakespeare he explains
 how their works function and where they fall short of the ideal laws of
 poetry. Thus the organic metaphor, for Coleridge, does not account for
 a poem but explains the ideal laws of its formation; and Coleridge is far
 less concerned with the personality behind the poem-William Words-
 worth or William Shakespeare-than with the product those two minds
 generate.
 The issue of theory versus law, however, is only indirectly a product
 of the scientific language in Biographia Literaria. The language itself is
 a much more immediate and powerful presence, and one of the more
 effective ways of emphasizing the ubiquitous presence of the scientific lan-
 guage is a simple comparison of passages from the scientific work and
 the literary work. These passages are among Coleridge's most frequently
 quoted, and one needs only refer to Coleridge's use of centripetal and
 centrifugal force, for example, in both "Theory of Life" and Biographia
 Literaria to see how directly that language transfers (TL, 391; BL 1,
 175). Moreover, there are passages in Biographia Literaria which seem
 to refer explicitly to the medical debate, using terms which ostensibly have
 9 Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross (London, 1907), II, 65, (Hereafter,
 BL).
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 little bearing on literature. This passage from chapter twelve of the Bio-
 graphia could have been lifted directly from "Theory of Life," though in
 context it becomes relevant to Coleridge's epistemology and hence his
 poetics:
 The highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiri-
 tualization of all laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect. The phae-
 nomena (the material) must wholly disappear, and the laws alone (the formal)
 must remain. ... The optical phaenomena are but a geometry, the lines of
 which are drawn by light, and the materiality of this light itself has already
 become a matter of doubt. In the appearance of magnetism all trace of matter
 is lost, and of the phaenomena of gravitation . . . there remains nothing but its
 law, the execution of which on a vast scale is the mechanism of the heavenly
 motions. (BL I, 175)
 Further, Coleridge himself suggests what the evolutionary scheme of
 "Theory of Life" means to the practicing artist. "Each thing that lives,"
 he writes in his essay "On Poesy or Art," has "its moment of self-exposi-
 tion, and so has each period of each thing"; "each step of nature hath its
 ideal, and . . . the possibility of climax up to the perfect form of a har-
 monized chaos." Therefore, the "artist must imitate that which is within
 the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourse to
 us by symbols-the Natur-geist, ... for so only can he hope to produce
 any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect" (BL,
 259, 262). Contrast this description of imitation to Coleridge's earlier
 and vaguer distinction between imitation and copying, and it is obvious
 how his scientific scheme of evolution elaborates and extends that original
 notion of imitation. The scientific language transforms the earlier sim-
 plistic and static definition of imitation as "a combination of a certain de-
 gree of dissimilitude with a certain degree of similitude" into a more
 dynamic, evolutionary concept that anticipates the pseudo-scientific po-
 etics of Hulme and others.20
 A final and more concrete example of Coleridge's transferring the
 language of scientific discourse to the definitions and literary principles
 in Biographia Literaria is his description of genius, specifically of Words-
 worth's genius. Out of context the statement on Wordsworth's develop-
 ment seems an ungainly simile; however, in the context of the medical
 debate whose occasion and primary issue was the nature of physiological
 disorders and diseases, the language reverberates with a special biological
 significance:
 it is remarkable how soon genius clears and purifies itself from the faults and
 errors of its earliest products; faults which, in its earliest compositions, are the
 20 Shakespearan Criticism, ed. T. M. Raysor (London, 1960), II, 53. That the
 language here and in Biographia Literaria often comes directly from Schlegel or
 Schelling does not weaken my argument since it is the use of the scientific
 discourse that matters, not its origin.
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 more obtrusive and confluent, because as heterogeneous elements, which had
 only a temporary use, they constitute the very ferment, by which they them-
 selves are carried off. Or we may compare them to some disease, which must
 work on humours, and be thrown out on the surface, in order to secure the
 patient from their future recurrence. (BL I, 57-58)
 Here Coleridge's language produces a meaning insofar as it suggests a
 rather peculiar, biological understanding of how genius develops and
 how artistic faults correct themselves. Express this idea in different terms
 and a different idea takes its place.2'
 In each of these examples, I am drawing attention to the scientific
 language itself as the formative agent in Coleridge's pronouncements on
 literature. Hence, my position is opposite that of most critics who view
 the scientific language as a metaphor in a monistic system that merges
 different terminologies. Coleridge's monistic vision is undeniable, but the
 scientific discourse is clearly more than metaphoric-or at least meta-
 phors and similes have a greater role and a more complicated function
 than most critics have observed in the past. If Coleridge's vision is monis-
 tic, his understanding is pluralistic.2
 In a recent article Jonathan Culler makes a similar point about the
 connotative power and cultural significance of two of Coleridge's most
 important critical terms, allegory and symbol. Culler begins his analysis
 of Coleridge by describing the structural differences which distinguish an
 allegorical sign from a symbolic sign: "The allegorical sign, we might
 say, is arbitrary: the connection between signifier and signified is imposed
 by the mind or fancy, while the eye and imagination are aware primarily
 of the difference. The symbol, on the other hand, is a motivated sign, a
 synecdoche, in which the signifier is naturally connected to the signified."
 This distinction relates, in turn, to the opposition between mechanical and
 organic form, the allegory being identified with the mechanical and the
 symbol with the organic. We thus have here two fundamental tropes or
 codes, or "two ways of organizing the attribution of meaning," the alle-
 gorical and the symbolic. And according to Culler, a general doctrinal or
 cultural "shift in formal operations for the production of meaning" ac-
 counts for Coleridge's preference for the symbolic.23
 21 Discussing Coleridge's use of the word "polarity," J. Isaacs makes this same
 point in "Coleridge's Critical Terminology," Essays and Studies (Oxford, 1936),
 XXI, 82. He notes: "this is not merely a loose employment of the normal use of
 the word. ... The fact that this use is a subtle and thought-out transference of
 the term to the great central problem of multeity in unity, gives an emotional
 significance of the highest order to this otherwise cold technical term."
 221 have argued this point more fully, and have provided a hermetical founda-
 tion for it - a foundation derived from Coleridge's views on reading, language,
 and understanding - in "Coleridge, the Reader: Language in a Combustible
 Mind." This article will appear in a forthcoming issue of Philological Quarterly
 (Winter 1980).
 23 "Literary History, Allegory, and Semiology," New Literary History, 7
 (Winter, 1976), 263-64.
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 Culler, I believe, overstates this last point, for this shift in the opera-
 tions for the production of meaning is less an undefined doctrinal shift
 than it is, first of all, a product of his contemporaries' scientific discourse
 and an organismic trope. That is, Coleridge's preference for the symbolic
 is, above all else, connected with scientific issues and scientific language
 of his day, especially with the new organicism whose emergence Culler
 describes in terms of scientific research of the period. Many other fields
 of knowledge, such as history, were undergoing similar changes in episte-
 mology, but science was clearly providing the key terms. My point is this:
 formal operations in language do not change "generally," as Culler says,
 but alter because of changes in the operations of a specific discourse
 which, in turn, affect the formal operations in the discourses surrounding
 it. Such is the case here, and Culler, perhaps unwittingly, confirms this
 when he depends on the biological term "organism" to denote the linguis-
 tic shift in other discourses such as history.
 Coleridge's 1816 distinction between allegory and symbol, one of his
 most famous critical definitions and tools, indicates the extent to which
 many of his literary maxims at this time derive their structure from scien-
 tific discourse. I have already shown how in a number of places his scien-
 tific language is transferred directly to a literary context, resulting in criti-
 cal principles which have made Coleridge famous and infamous at once.
 In those examples, the scientific language provides definitions or codes
 explicitly meant to organize the attribution of meaning in literature, so
 that reading a poem as either allegorical or symbolic has important reper-
 cussions regarding how and what the poem means. Much less explicitly
 the scientific discourse controls much of the practical criticism of Bio-
 graphia Literaria; and, though scientific language often has little bearing
 on Coleridge's descriptions and judgments of Wordsworth's poetry, just
 as often these critical interpretations are made by means of a scientific
 code or model which supplements the primary text and produces a kind of
 meaning one would be hard pressed to locate in Wordsworth's poetry.
 The features of the text which this scientific code selects for interpretation
 are naturally predetermined by the code itself, and a scientific language
 which has been arguing the priority of function over arrangement to a
 medical audience will accordingly be directed at the formal features of a
 poem.
 So much has been written about Coleridge's formal criticism and his
 organic model that it is not necessary to rehash points that have become
 commonplaces. What is worth attention, though, are the elaborations on
 that trope which follow from Coleridge's more subtle thinking about sci-
 ence in 1815, and the way these elaborations manifest themselves in the
 practical criticism of Biographia Literaria. For instance, Coleridge's
 ground for differentiating poetry and prose, the first truly practical prob-
 lem in the Biographia, immediately recalls the first issue of the medical
 controversy over mechanical structure vs. organic function:
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 A poem contains the same elements as a prose composition; the difference
 therefore must consist in a different combination of them, in consequence of a
 different object being proposed. According to the difference of the object will
 be the difference of the combination. It is possible, that the object may be
 merely to facilitate the recollection of any given facts or observations by arti-
 ficial arrangement; and the composition will be a poem, merely because it is
 distinguished from prose by meter, or by rhyme, or by both conjointly. (BL
 II, 8)
 In short, what differentiates poetry and prose is not mere arrangement of
 "elements," as the mechanistic scientists would argue, but the function
 of the two forms, the "object being proposed" by each.
 The emphasis on function over arrangement informs the vast majority
 of critical judgments in Biographia Literaria; and, as Coleridge attempts
 to employ this formula in different and more subtle ways when analyzing
 poems, scientific tropes and biological descriptions more overtly prejudice
 the judgments. In fact, biological descriptions and connotations are so
 ubiquitous that the scientific world of plants and organisms merges with
 the literary world. Differentiating Wordsworth's and Coleridge's natural
 world, Abrams notes that the "nature" Coleridge "ultimately appeals to
 in art is basically a biological nature," and it "is astonishing how much
 of Coleridge's critical writing is couched in terms that are metaphorical
 for art and literal for plants. . . . Only let the vehicle of his metaphors
 come alive, and you see all the objects of criticism writhe surrealistically
 into plants or parts of plants, growing in tropical profusion."24 Indeed
 Coleridge's prefatory statement on Wordsworth's "Descriptive Sketches"
 is a description of an organic jungle:
 seldom, if ever, was the emergence of an original genius above the literary hori-
 zon more evidently announced. In the form, style, and manner of the whole
 poem, and in the structure of particular lines and periods, there is an harshness
 and acerbity connected and combined with words and images all a-glow, which
 might recall those products of the vegetable world, where gorgeous blossoms
 rise out of the hard and thorny rind and shell, within which the rich fruit was
 elaborating. The language was not only peculiar and strong, but at times knotty
 and contorted, as by its own impatient strength. (BL I, 56; my emphasis)
 Later, he lists as the third and fourth excellences of Wordsworth's poetry
 "the sinewy strength and originality of single lines and paragraphs ....
 the perfect truth of nature in his images and descriptions, as taken imme-
 diately from nature, and proving a long and genial intimacy with the very
 spirit which gives the physiognomic expression to all works of nature"
 (BL II, 121). And finally, "as a sort of allegory, or connected simile and
 metaphor of Wordsworth's intellect and genius," Coleridge quotes Bar-
 tram's Travels: "'The soil is a deep, rich, dark mould, on a deep stratum
 24 The Mirror and the Lamp (London, 1953), 121.
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 of tenacious clay; and that on a foundation of rocks, which often break
 through both strata, lifting their back above the surface. The trees which
 chiefly grow here are the gigantic black oak; magnolia magni-flora; fai-
 nus excelsior; platane; and a few stately tulip trees'" (BL II, 128-29).
 Three years after these statements Coleridge would call Shakespeare a
 "comparative anatomist" who "works from within by evolution and as-
 similation" and produces beautiful fruits, unlike Beaumont and Fletcher
 who "took from the ear and eye, unchecked by any intuition of an inward
 possibility, just as a man might fit together a quarter of an orange, a
 quarter of an apple, and the like of a lemon and of a pomegranate, and
 make it look like one round diverse colored fruit."25
 Although Abrams hesitates to admit it and Coleridge himself back-
 pedals by asking pardon for the terms borrowed from chemistry and bot-
 any, Coleridge clearly intended Wordsworth's and Shakespeare's poetry
 literally to come alive and be seen as a living organism. Poetic language
 can never actually have a "physiognomic expression," which, however,
 Coleridge's critical language can attribute to Wordsworth's and Shakes-
 peare's poetry by using a biological language to connote and signify a
 biological referent. Abrams himself suggests this productive power when
 in The Mirror and the Lamp he explains how critical metaphors and
 analogies are often not simply illustrative but constitutive. This is certainly
 the case here where Coleridge's scientific code reconstructs poetry as a
 living organism, a three-dimensional object, which functions in much the
 same way as his plants and animals and men in "Theory of Life." Walter
 Pater, I believe, is more correct than most critics admit when he com-
 plains of Coleridge's identifying the poem with an actual plant: in Bio-
 graphia Literaria Coleridge certainly exaggerates the case this way. Cole-
 ridge may be, as critics have traditionally observed, concerned with the
 creative process, the subjective nature of poetry, but in the Biographia
 that process is objectified, presented as a product, by using a scientific
 language which transforms the forces of the process into forces of a prod-
 uct. The language is much more elusive in Biographia Literaria, but it is
 quite clear that the forces operative in a poem correlate directly with the
 three forces of nature: magnetism, electricity, and chemical affinity. There
 is, in other words, a six-part homology established between the world of
 biology and the world of poetry. The great value in transferring this three-
 part model from science to poetry is that in this way Coleridge could
 distinguish different operations in a poem while implicitly suggesting their
 unity on the evidence that, as in the biological example in "Theory of
 Life," "the lower powers are assimilated, not merely employed-which
 presupposes homogeneity" (TL, 386).
 25 Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism, ed. T. M. Raysor (Cambridge, Mass.,
 1936), 95, 42-3.
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 Of the three powers which Coleridge describes in "Theory of Life,"
 magnetism or polarity is the one he most frequently discusses. In "Theory
 of Life" he makes it clear that, as the most basic force in nature, magne-
 tism is the first expression of the polarity principle; and in this state it is
 predominantly mechanical, "two equal forces acting in opposite direc-
 tions" (BL I, 197). Barfield, without doubt the most lucid explicator of
 polarity, makes the crucial point that the mechanical law of polarity must
 be distinguished from the power of polarity; for if magnetism is an essen-
 tially mechanical law, it eventually becomes assimilated into a higher
 power which is essentially dynamic. In their most primitive form, before
 their conversion into a vital power, the poles of a magnet provide an
 object with fixity: the magnetic poles are "the primary constituent Pow-
 ers."26 As Seth Watson observes in his introduction to "Theory of Life,"
 magnetism thus becomes the "first and simplest differential act of Nature
 ... the first step from indifference to difference, from formless homoge-
 neity to independent existence" (TL, 360).
 In a poem this rudimentary act of fixity and differentiation is de-
 scribed by the famous pairs which comprise all poems and which become
 objectified elements in the poem-"sameness with difference; of the gen-
 eral, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the
 representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar
 objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order"
 (BL II, 12). These differentiate a poem, define it, and balance it, as it
 were, in a fixed position. Balance, in fact, is the key to the polar arrange-
 ment in a poem, just as it is in a magnet, for "in all pure phaenomena we
 behold only the copula, the balance or indifference of opposite ener-
 gies."27 Accordingly, where Wordsworth's feelings are "disproportionate
 to such knowledge and value of objects described" the stability of the
 poem is upset; and accusing Wordsworth of mental bombast is a criticism
 of misbalanced energies (BL II, 109). Likewise, Coleridge complains of
 metaphysical poets and some of his contemporaries who in different ways
 destroy the balance needed in a poem. "Our faulty elder poets sacrificed
 the passion and passionate flow of poetry to the subtleties of intellect, and
 to the starts of wit; the moderns to the glare and glitter of a perpetual,
 yet broken and heterogeneous imagery, or rather to an amphibious some-
 thing, made up, half of image, and half of abstract meaning. The one
 sacrificed the heart to the head; the other both heart and head to point
 and drapery" (BL I, 15).
 Because Coleridge himself rarely dissected his polarity principle and
 only in "Theory of Life" and in his long letter to Tulk in 1817 made a sus-
 tained attempt to show clearly how it relates to the magnetic law as op-
 26 Cited in Owen Barfield, What Coleridge Thought (Middleton, Conn., 1971),
 32.
 27 Collected Letters, IV, 760.
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 posed to the electrical power, critics often confuse the polarity of magnet-
 ism and the polarity of electricity. But in order to fully understand the
 intricacies of the criticism in Biographia Literaria, and especially the role
 of imagination, one must be aware of these finer distinctions. Again,
 polarity is the first law of nature, and magnetism's property of attraction
 and repulsion is the first manifestation of that law. But, the two poles of
 magnetism generate a second force, electricity, which simultaneously vital-
 izes the fixed magnetic field and stands as the force opposite to magnetism.
 (Magnetism and electricity become intersecting axes, each axis having
 two poles.) In Coleridge's evolutionary scheme, the magnetic force mani-
 fests itself most obviously in inorganic metals, and later, when the elec-
 trical force becomes predominant, vegetables and insects appear. Thus,
 from the conjunction of electricity and magnetism, in various proportions,
 the different forms of life are made. In the arrangement, represented by
 the magnetic poles, "life subsists"; in their strife, represented by electric-
 ity, "it [life] consists" (TL, 393).
 The addition of this life-producing power to Coleridge's scientific
 scheme should never be underestimated. Seth Watson went so far as to
 say that electricity was "the foundation of life" for Coleridge. This is of
 course an exaggeration, a point Coleridge made abundantly clear in
 "Theory of Life" where electricity functions only as a primary manifesta-
 tion of one power in life. Yet, electricity did provide an illustration and
 scientific solution to a scientific scheme that associates magnetism with
 lifeless arrangement. A "new light was struck by the discovery of electric-
 ity, and in every sense of the word, . . . it may be affirmed to have elec-
 trified the whole frame of natural philosophy" (TL, 375). Electricity was
 a power that could convert the static arrangement of the magnetic field
 into a space of vital action and movement.28 Magnetism represented the
 law of polarity, electricity the vitalization or operation of that law. If
 magnetism demonstrated the law of polarity in inorganic matter, elec-
 tricity could assimilate magnetism to reveal the one power which brings
 polarity to life in organic matter. The principle of fixity thus fuses with
 the principle of dynamic motion; or, as he phrases it in a description of
 artistic beauty, "confining form" unites with the "electrical flashes" of
 "free life" ("Genial Criticism," 235).
 In Biographia Literaria the imagination is an objectified power within
 the poem and, as such, it is the counterpart to the electrical power in
 nature described in "Theory of Life." The scientific language with which
 it is described is indicative of this correspondence: "The primary imagi-
 nation I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Per-
 ception. . . . The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the
 former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the
 primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in
 28 See The Friend, I, 478-79.
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 the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, and dissipates, in order to
 recreate.... It is essentially vital, even as objects (as objects) are essen-
 tially fixed and dead" (BL I, 202; my emphasis). "This power, first put
 in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremis-
 sive, though gentle and unnoticed control ... reveals itself in the balance
 or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities" (BL II, 12). Here
 the language is that of a scientific experiment in which an electrical force,
 the imagination, galvanizes different elements that are brought under its
 power: working together, the will and understanding act as a conductor
 that organizes a field of "opposite and discordant qualities" which the
 fusing power of the imagination vitalizes in a manner strikingly similar
 to the operation of the electrical force found in nature. Shakespeare's
 work is thus a "growth, evolution" whereby "each line, each word almost,
 begets the following-and the will of the writer is an interfusion, a con-
 tinuous agency, no series of separate acts."29 The conducting will unites
 with the fusing imagination to become "an interfusion, a continuous agen-
 cy" of power and control that at once organizes and activates the multiple
 elements of a wide and varied experience.
 The clearest use of electricity in practical criticism is found in Cole-
 ridge's analysis of meter. He begins by describing the origins of meter,
 tracing it "to the balance of the mind effected by the spontaneous effort
 which strives to hold in check the workings of passion. It might be easily
 explained likewise in what manner this salutary antagonism is assisted by
 the very state, which it counteracts; and how this balance of antagonists
 becomes organized into meter . . . by a supervening act of the will and
 judgment" (BL II, 50). Meter, that is, is generated out of a polarity of
 passion and the controlling effort of the mind which, like the magnetic
 field, together form a balance of antagonists between which the will inter-
 venes like a conductor. Metrical restraint is then balanced with a language
 of passion ("as every passion has its proper pulse, so it will likewise have
 its characteristic mode of expression" (BL II, 56). In short, mental re-
 straint and passion balance in an original act of the mind that results in
 meter; to create poetry, this metrical framework is in turn bound and
 balanced with a special, emotional language: "meter therefore having
 been connected with poetry most often and by a peculiar fitness, whatever
 else is combined with meter must, though it not be essentially poetic, have
 nevertheless some property in common with poetry, as an intermedium
 of affinity, a sort (if I may dare borrow a well-known phrase from tech-
 nical chemistry) of mordaunt between it and the super-added meter" (BL
 II, 55). The suggestion here-which could be made only through the
 scientific language in which it is couched-is that meter can be either an
 artificial or natural part of a poem in that "an intermedium of affinity"
 should naturally bind meter to the language of a poem. And although
 29 Miscellaneous Criticism, 88-9.
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 Coleridge never explicitly explains it in terms of the imagination, it seems
 clear that what activates this affinity is the imagination that he consistently
 describes, with similar scientific language, as the power which vitalizes
 and unites contrary elements. Where Coleridge fails to discover this bal-
 ance and conjunction between the language of the poetry and the meter,
 in Wordsworth's "Anecdote for Fathers," "Simon Lee," "Alice Fell,"
 "The Beggars," and "The Sailor's Mother," he rightly claims then that
 these poems "would have been delightful... in prose, told and managed,
 as by Mr. Wordsworth they would have been, in a moral essay, or pedes-
 trian tour" (BL II, 53). About "The Sailor's Mother" specifically, he
 quotes three stanzas and queries "whether in the meter itself he found a
 sufficient reason for their being written metrically?" (BL II, 54), tacitly
 referring here, I believe, to the model he has established whereby there
 must be a vitalized affinity between the meter and the language of the
 poem. As the two are joined but not imaginatively united in the Words-
 worth poem, the meter sits oddly on the language of the poem just as the
 leaves of one flower would look strange if unnaturally grafted on the stem
 of another species.
 In "Theory of Life" Coleridge discusses magnetism and electricity
 also in terms of "progressive individuation" and this concept too bears on
 evaluations and judgments in Biographia Literaria. In nature, "the un-
 ceasing polarity of life" represented by magnetism, Coleridge writes, is
 "the form of its progress, and its tendency to progressive individuation"
 is "the law of its direction" (TL, 407). Here magnetic polarity describes
 the form, and what I have associated with the imagination (in art) and
 the electrical force (in nature), namely the process within the form, now
 becomes "the tendency to progressive individuation." Progressive indi-
 viduation embraces two counteracting tendencies in nature, "that of de-
 tachment from the universal life . . . and that of attachment or reduction
 into it" (TL, 389), both of which reappear in the Biographia and the
 related essays in the phrase "multeity in unity," whose definition almost
 always approximates the definition of progressive individuation. Com-
 menting on the pleasure of art, Coleridge says it "consists in the identity
 of two opposite elements, that is to say-sameness and variety. ... In
 order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle
 of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of the multeity the
 centripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the
 predominance of the centrifugal force. This unity in multeity I have else-
 where stated as the principle of beauty" (BL II, 262). And, early in
 Biographia Literaria, Coleridge lays the groundwork for differentiating
 kinds of creative minds by distinguishing the centrifugal and centripetal
 forces in the mind: "The intelligence in the one tends to objectize itself,
 and in the other to know itself in the object" (BL I, 188).
 Whether Coleridge is talking about the creative process of art or the
 forces of nature, the significance of the language remains the same in
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 each of these passages. As the progressive individuation manifested in the
 electrical force unites and vitalizes two opposite movements in the life
 process, in poetry the imagination performs the same task; and, though
 Coleridge never bluntly states this, he values a work of art most when
 its centrifugal-centripetal make-up resembles man, the organism in whom
 the two forces reach their maximum strength and scope, in whom there
 is the "highest realization and reconciliation of both . . . tendencies, that
 of most perfect detachment and the greatest possible union" (TL, 422).
 Accordingly, if the paramount, most admirable organism is the one
 that manifests the most detachment with the greatest attachment, in lit-
 erature most value will be awarded to the work that manifests the greatest
 individuality with the greatest universality.3" The works of Shakespeare
 and Milton are Coleridge's examples here. Shakespeare's plays not only
 have a universal scope and variety but they also contain a proportionate
 degree of judgment and unity; "in Shakespeare the play is syngensia [a
 flower species]-each indeed has a life of its own and is an individuum
 of itself, but yet an organ to the whole.""3 Conversely, while always re-
 taining the stamp of the individual man, the poems of Milton contain the
 greatest of eternal truths. Wordsworth too is praised as "individualized";
 but his characters, unlike Shakespeare's, are faulted as overly peculiar and
 "incongruous," "for amid the strongest individuation, the character must
 still remain representative" (BL II, 106-7). Finally, the great philosophi-
 cal poem that Coleridge expected from Wordsworth would doubtless have
 been great because, like man, the scope of its vision would have been
 matched by the strength of its individuality.
 I have discussed progressive individuation in its relation to the second
 power in Coleridge's biological scheme, electricity in nature and the imag-
 ination in poetry, since Coleridge most usually associates it with these
 two phenomena. Yet, as all three powers are bound together in a single
 organism, so the tendency to individuate cannot be separated from the
 third power, chemical affinity, which corresponds to the intellectual en-
 ergy and reason behind a poem. As Coleridge demonstrates throughout
 "Theory of Life," chemical affinity adds the dimension of depth to an
 organism when it unites with length and breadth, magnetism and elec-
 tricity, and Coleridge equates this chemical affinity with sensibility. He
 describes this third dimension best in a manuscript note:
 all that is outside is comprized in length and surface-what remains must there-
 fore be inside-but again, the sole definition of matter is that which fills space
 -now it is with length, breadth, and length relative to breadth that space is
 filled. In other words, Space has relation only to the outside. Depth must there-
 fore be that by not with which space is filled . . . it must be that which causes
 it to be filled, and is therefore the true substance. Depth therefore cannot be
 0 I. A. Richards, another scientific critic, inherited this notion from Coleridge.
 31 Miscellaneous Criticism, 95.
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 an attribute of matter, which (i.e. Length+Breadth or Extension) is itself a
 mere abstraction, an ens rationis; but it must be a Power, the essence of which
 is inwardness, outwardness being its effect and mode of manifesting itself.32
 Illustrating inwardness, "the true substance," in a poem will always be
 a perilous task for a critic; but nonetheless Coleridge attempts it, if some-
 what coyly, by locating a particular kind of sensibility in a poem. He
 praises the "atmosphere and depth and height" of Wordsworth's poetic
 world; and he characterizes the fifth of Wordsworth's excellences, a medi-
 tative pathos, as "a union of deep and subtle thought with sensibility"
 (BL II, 122). For Coleridge this is an important and positive criticism
 of Wordsworth, and it correlates neatly with the third dimension of an
 organism-depth, sensibility, and inwardness of thought. An elusive and
 protean presence but one which most readers are aware of and recognize
 in a poem, "thought" is perhaps as specific as Coleridge can be about a
 third dimensional property in a poem. But how to show it working in a
 poem is extremely difficult, and this difficulty could account for the com-
 paratively little Coleridge says about depth in a poem. As a power in
 the poem it dwells in the realm of Coleridge's reason and philosophical
 "Ideas," clearly distinguished from the imaginative power, so that, besides
 imagination, Shakespeare possesses another poetic power "without which
 the former could scarce exist in a high degree," namely, "Depth and En-
 ergy of Thought." In an 1818 lecture, Coleridge describes the conjunction
 of these two powers, imaginative force and depth, this way: Shakespeare
 "worked in the spirit of nature, by evolving the germ within the imagina-
 tive power according to an idea." For, "No man was ever yet a great poet,
 without being at the same time a profound philosopher. ... In Shakes-
 peare's poems the creative power and the intellectual energy wrestle as
 in a war embrace" (BL II, 19). The thinker, as well as the imaginative
 artist, adds a dimension to the poem, so that balance, imagination, and
 energy of thought unite in a poem, like electricity, magnetism, and chemi-
 cal affinity in the life process, to create an object that is as complicated
 and mysterious as the highest organism in nature.
 This ultimately mysterious nature of art and life Coleridge never for-
 gets, no matter how analytical he becomes, and so his three dimensional
 model should never be confused with poetic truth and life itself. If the
 constituent forces of life are the power of length (magnetism), the power
 of surface (electricity), and the power of depth (chemical affinity), "Life
 itself is neither of these separately, but the copula of all three" (TL, 430).
 Indeed the powers of life may manifest themselves in concrete comprehen-
 sible forms, yet "visible surface and power of any kind, much more the
 power of life, are ideas which the forms of human understanding make
 it impossible to identify" (TL, 378). Likewise, the living truth of a poem
 32 Cited in Barfield, 202.
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 exists beyond the components Coleridge chooses to isolate for criticism,
 and a critic's most egregious mistake would be to imagine Wordsworth's
 or any author's poetry simple and containable.
 What Coleridge and other literary critics can do is to understand and
 explain life and poetry with language. Precisely because of its linguistic
 nature, this act of understanding will always be an act of commitment
 and choice-a choice of how he will understand and, subsequently, what
 he will understand. Scientific language does not accidentally or inadver-
 tently appear in Biographia Literaria; it is the controlling discourse that
 Coleridge chooses for good reasons and with full knowledge of its im-
 plications. He recognizes the power of connotations; he recognizes the
 way different tropes and metaphors could not only organize but produce
 meanings. He writes about a "fusing power" in a poem entirely conscious
 of its commensurability with the "fusing power" of electricity. And, de-
 scribing "depth" in a poem or its centripetal-centrifugal balance, Cole-
 ridge consciously creates a meaning, a biological meaning, rather than
 extracting that meaning from a poem. In 1815 the language of sci-
 ence was gaining an authority that could only diminish the authority of
 other languages: due to the purported objectivity of scientific practice and
 discourse, scientific statements simply had more validity than poetic or
 theological statements. For Coleridge, the way to counter this trend was
 to make a poem mean scientifically, to show that scientific truths are no
 more confined to science than scientific discourse is the sole property of
 the laboratory worker. If poetry should never pretend to be science, po-
 etry should never cower before the language of science. Coleridge's scien-
 tific poetics and biological tropes are an important attempt to show that
 poetry is at least as challenging, mysterious, and intellectually rigorous
 as the best of modern science.
 Temple University.
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